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Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000400160006-1

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11 OCT 1971

THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who, if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very

rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did at the CIA was to explain to Director



Mr. Marchetti

"I told him I thought the intelligence community and the intelligence agency were too big and too costly; that I thought there was too much military influence on intelligence—and very bad effects from that—and that I felt the need for more control and more direction."

"The clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold-war mentality—these kinds of things made me feel the agency was really out of step with the times," Marchetti said.

"We parted friends. I cried all the way home."

Marchetti, 41, hardly looks the stereotype of a man who spent 14 years in the CIA.

His dark-rimmed glasses, full face, slightly stout figure, soft voice, curly black hair and bushy sideburns would seem more at home on a college campus. He pronounces his name the Italian way—*Marketti*.

Marchetti's first impulse after quitting the CIA was to write a nonfiction account of what was wrong with the U. S. intelligence community. But, he said, he could not bring himself to do it then.

Instead he wrote a spy novel—"a reaction to the James Bond and British spy-story stereotypes"—which he says looks at the intelligence business realistically from the headquarters point of view he knows so well.

The novel, "The Rope Dancer," was published last month. It is a thinly disguised view of the inner struggle over Vietnam and Russian strategic advances as Marchetti saw them within the CIA, the Pentagon and the White House under President Johnson.

Writing the novel took a year. Then came two tries at nonfiction articles—one rejected as too dull and the other turned down as too chatty—and a start on a second novel.

But Marchetti said the need for intelligence reform continued to gnaw at him, and as his first novel was about to come out he came into contact with others who agreed with him, including Representative Herman Badillo (Dem.), of New York.

Now, Marchetti said, the second novel has been laid aside so he can devote full time to a campaign for reform.

"Intelligence Business Is Just Too Big"

Although now a dove—particularly on Vietnam, which he calls an unwinnable war to "support a crooked, corrupt regime that cannot even run an election that looks honest"—Marchetti says he still believes strongly in the need for intelligence collection.

"It's a fact of life," he said. "For your own protection you need to know what other people are thinking."

"But intelligence is now a 6-billion-dollar-a-year business, and that is just too big. It can be done for a lot less, and perhaps done better when you cut out the waste."

For instance, Marchetti said, the National Security Agency—charged in part with trying to decode intercepted messages of foreign governments—wastes about half its 1-billion-dollar yearly budget.

"They have boxcars full of tapes up at Fort Meade (Md.) that are 10 years old—boxcars full—because in intercepting Soviet (radio) communications, for instance, the Soviets are just as sophisticated as we are in scrambler systems. It is almost a technical impossibility to break a scrambled, coded message. So they just keep collecting the stuff and putting it in boxcars. They continue to listen all over the world. They continue to spend fortunes trying to duplicate the Soviet (scrambling and encoding) computers," he said.

"By the time someone can break it, a decade or two has gone by. So you find out what they were thinking 20 years ago—so what?"

Marchetti said at one time a national intelligence review board tried to cut out an expensive program that an-

alysts agreed was useless. The CIA Director, he said, wrote a memorandum recommending the program stop.

"But Paul Nitze, on his last day in office (as Deputy Secretary of Defense), sent back a memo in which he said he had received the recommendation and considered it, but had decided to continue the program," Marchetti said. He said this was possible for Nitze because, although the Director of the CIA is officially in charge of all the nation's intelligence activities, 85 per cent of the money is hidden in the Defense Department budget.

This, said Marchetti, gives the military considerable power to shape intelligence estimates. He gave as an example a conflict between military and CIA estimates of the number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in South Vietnam during the late 1960s.

The military wanted a low figure "to show they were killing the VC and North Vietnamese and were winning the war." The CIA reported far too many Communists in South Vietnam to support this military desire, he said.

Ultimately, Marchetti said, the military won and the CIA issued an estimate in which "tricky wording" seemed to make its views agree with those of the generals.

"Browbeating, Pressure" to Change Reports

"Whenever you're working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in—because it's affecting one of their programs or their war in Vietnam or something—and you're not saying what they want you to say, the browbeating starts: the delaying tactics, the pressure to get the report to read more like they want it to read," he said—"in other words, influencing intelligence for the benefit of their own operation or activity."

"Somehow, some way, you've got to keep your intelligence objective. It can't be a private tool of the military—or, for that matter, a private tool of the White House."

Marchetti said there is also waste in almost every technical intelligence-gathering program—such as spy satellites, special reconnaissance aircraft, and over-the-horizon radars—because when either the military or the CIA makes a new advance the rival agency follows suit with something almost the same but just different enough to justify its existence.

"The CIA People Can Start Up Wars"

The thing that troubles Marchetti most about the CIA is its penchant for the dark arts of clandestine paramilitary actions—an area made doubly attractive to the Agency because the military scarcely can operate in this field.

"One of the things the CIA clandestine people can do is start up wars," he said. "They can start up a private war in a country clandestinely and make it look like it's just something that the local yokels have decided to do themselves."

This, according to Marchetti, is how the United States first began active fighting in Vietnam. It is the type of activity now going on in Cambodia and Laos, where recent congressional testimony revealed the CIA is running a 450-million-dollar-a-year operation, he said.

Marchetti said he is convinced the CIA not only engineered the 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime in [South] Vietnam, which President Nixon also has said was the case, but was also responsible for the coup that ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk [of Cambodia] in early 1970, making possible the U. S.-South Vietnamese raid on Communist sanctuaries in that country several weeks later.

The Southeast Asia clandestine operations years ago caused the CIA to set up a phony airline company, Air America,

[continued from preceding page]

which now has as many employees as the 18,000-member working staff of the CIA itself, he said.

"Well, the CIA is not only monkeying around in Vietnam and in Laos," Marchetti said--"they're looking at other areas where these sorts of opportunities may present themselves.

"When they start setting up private air companies and everything else that goes with the wherewithal for supporting a government or an antigovernment movement, this is very, very dangerous, because they can do it in a clandestine fashion and make it difficult for the public to be aware of what is going on."

Marchetti said areas where the CIA might launch future clandestine paramilitary activities include South America, India, Africa and the Philippines--all places in the throes of social upheaval. Upheaval, he said, is what prompts the CIA Director to begin planning possible clandestine activities in a country.

"That is so if the President says, 'Go in and do something'; he's already got his fake airlines to fly in people. He may have a program going with the police in this country or the military in that," according to Marchetti.

In addition to Air America, Marchetti said, the CIA has set up both Southern Air Transport in Miami and Rocky Mountain Air in Phoenix for possible use in paramilitary operations in South America.

Similar fake airlines have been bought and sold all over the world, he said, including one in Nepal and another in East Africa.

He also said the CIA has a big depot in the Midwest United States "where they have all kinds of military equipment, all kinds of unmarked weapons."

"Over the years they have bought everything they can get their hands on all over the world that is untraceable--to prepare for the contingency that they might want to ship arms to a group in a place like Guatemala," Marchetti said. "They even used to send weapons buyers around to buy arms from the (Soviet) bloc countries."

To fully understand why the CIA conducts semilegal operations around the world, why it might begin to conduct them in the United States and why more control needs to be exercised over the Agency, Marchetti said it is necessary to understand the men of the CIA.

Most of them, he said, got their start in the intelligence war II, when the cold war was going strong.

"These people are superpatriots," he said. "But you've got to remember, too, they're amoral. They're not immoral; they're amoral."

"The Director made a speech to the National Press Club where he said, 'You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men.'"

"Well, they are honorable men--generally speaking. But the nature of the business is such that it is amoral."

"Most things are right or wrong, good or evil, moral or immoral. The nature of intelligence is that you do things because they have to be done, whether it's right or wrong. If you murder--"

Marchetti did not complete the sentence.

Because the men of the Agency are superpatriots, he said, it is only natural for them to view violent protest and dissidence as a major threat to the nation. The inbred CIA reaction, he said, would be to launch a clandestine operation to infiltrate dissident groups.

That, said Marchetti, may already have started to happen.

"I don't have very much to go on," he said. "Just bits and pieces that indicate the U.S. intelligence community is already targeting on groups in this country that they feel to be subversive."

"I know this was being discussed in the halls of the CIA, and that there were a lot of people who felt this should be done."

Needed: "More Controls by Congress"


With the lack of control that exists now over the Agency, Marchetti said, an extremely reactionary President could perhaps order the CIA's clandestine activities to go beyond mere infiltration.

"I don't think the likelihood of this is very great," Marchetti said, "but one of the ways to prevent this is to let a little sunshine in, to have some more controls by the Congress."

"There's no reason for so much secrecy. There's no reason the intelligence community shouldn't have its budget examined. It just bothers the hell out of me to see this waste going on and this hiding behind the skirts of national security."

"You can have your national security--with controls--and you don't need 6 billion dollars to do it."

Headquarters for the CIA's worldwide activities. It is located amid the Virginia woodlands not far from the nation's capital. --USN&WR Photo



Special Report

CIA Charged With Waste, Amorality

By EDWARD K. DELONG

OAKTON, Va. — (UPI) — Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was any aspiring young spy could ask.

But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it — that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations — Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I THINK WE NEED to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA — and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine ops (operations) — and there just aren't that many places anymore to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who — if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like — are certainly considering it.

This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against 'the enemy within.'"

MARCHETTI SPEAKS of the CIA from an insider's point of view.

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Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of — an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House.

During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

THEN HE WAS PROMOTED to the top of the staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting; as special assistant to the CIA's executive director; and as executive assistant to the agency's deputy director, Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done, and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too. The National Security Agency. The DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). The National Reconnaissance Organization. The whole bit.

"And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the communi-

ty and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

WITH many of his life-long views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did at the CIA was to explain to Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.

"I told him I thought the intelligence community and the intelligence agency were too big and too costly, that I thought there was too much military influence on intelligence — and very bad effects from that — and that I felt the need for more control and more direction.

"The clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold war mentality — these kinds of things made me feel the agency was really out of step with the times," Marchetti said.

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But Marchetti said the need for intelligence reform continued to gnaw at him, and as his first novel was about to come out he came into contact with others who agreed with him, including Rep. Herman Badillo, D-N.Y.

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"But intelligence is now a \$6 billion a year business, and that is just too big. It can be done for a lot less, and perhaps done better when you cut out the waste."

For instance, Marchetti said, the National Security Agency — charged in part with trying to decode intercepted messages of foreign governments — wastes about half its \$1 billion yearly budget.

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ULTIMATELY, Marchetti said, the military won and the CIA issued an estimate in which "tricky wording" seemed to make its views agree with those of the generals.

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"Somehow, some way, you've got to keep your intelligence objective. It can't be a private tool of the military. Nor, for that matter, a private tool of the White House."

Marchetti said there is also waste in almost every technical intelligence gathering program — such as spy satellites, special reconnaissance aircraft, and over-the-horizon radars — because when either the military or the CIA makes a new advance the rival agency follows suit with something almost the same but just different enough to justify its existence.

THE THING that troubles Marchetti most about the CIA is its penchant for the dark arts of clandestine paramilitary actions, an area made doubly attractive to the agency because the military scarcely can operate in this field.

"One of the things the CIA clandestine people can do is start

up wars," he said. "They can start up a private war in a country, clandestinely, and make it look like it's just something that the local yokels have decided to do themselves."

This, according to Marchetti, is how the United States first began active fighting in Vietnam. It is the type of activity now going on in Cambodia and Laos, where recent congressional testimony revealed the CIA is running a \$450 million a year operation, he said.

Marchetti said he is convinced the CIA not only engineered the 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime in Vietnam, which President Nixon also has said was the case, but was also responsible for the coup that ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk in early 1970, making possible the U. S.-South Vietnamese raid on Communist sanctuaries in that country several weeks later.

The Southeast Asia clandestine operations years ago caused the CIA to set up a phoney airline company, Air America, which now has as many employees as the 18,000-member working staff of CIA itself, he said.

"Well, the CIA is not only monkeying around in Vietnam and in Laos," Marchetti said. "They're looking at other areas where these sorts of opportunities may present themselves.

"When they start setting up private air companies and everything else that goes with the wherewithal for supporting a government or an anti-government movement, this is very, very dangerous. Because they can do it in a clandestine fashion and make it difficult for the public to be aware of what is going on."

MARCHETTI SAID areas where the CIA might launch future clandestine paramilitary activities include South America, India, Africa and the Philippines — all places in the throes of social upheaval. Upheaval, he said, is what prompts the CIA director to begin planning possible clandestine activities in a country.

"That is so if the President says go in and do something, he's already got his fake airlines to fly in people. He may have a program going with the police in this country or the military in that," according to Marchetti.

In addition to Air America, Marchetti said, the CIA has set up both Southern Air Transport in Miami and Rocky Mountain Air in Phoenix for possible use in paramilitary operations in South America. Similar fake airlines have been bought and sold all over the world, he said, including one in Africa.

HE ALSO SAID the CIA has a big depot in the midwest United States "where they have all kinds of military equipment, all kinds of unmarked weapons."

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To fully understand why the CIA conducts semi-legal operations around the world, why it might begin to conduct them in the United States, and why more control needs to be exercised over the agency, Marchetti said, it is necessary to understand the men of the CIA.

Most of them, he said, got their start in the intelligence business during or shortly after World War II when the cold war was going strong.

"These people are super-patriots," he said. "But you've got to remember, too, they're amoral. They're not immoral. They're amoral."

THE DIRECTOR made a speech to the National Press Club where he said "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." Well, they are honorable men — generally speaking.

"But the nature of the business is such that it is amoral. Most things are right or wrong, good or evil, moral or immoral. The nature of intelligence is that you do things because they have to be done, whether it's right or wrong. If you murder . . ."

Marchetti did not complete the sentence.

Because the men of the agency are super-patriots, he said, it is only natural for them to view violent protest and dissidence as a major threat to the nation. The inbred CIA reaction, he said, would be to launch a clandestine operation to infiltrate dissident groups.

That, said Marchetti, may already have started to happen.

"I don't have very much to go on," he said. "Just bits and pieces that indicate the U. S. intelligence community is already targeting on groups in this country that they feel to be subversive."

"I know this was being discussed in the halls of the CIA, and that there were a lot of people who felt this should be done."

WITH THE LACK of control that exists now over the agency, Marchetti said, an extremely

perhaps order the CIA's clandestine activities to go beyond mere infiltration.

"I don't think the likelihood of this is very great," Marchetti said. "But one of the ways to prevent this is to let a little sunshine in, to have some more controls by the Congress."

"There's no reason for so much secrecy. There's no reason the intelligence community shouldn't have its budget examined. It just bothers the hell out of me to see this waste going on and this hiding behind the skirts of national security. You can have your national security, with controls, and you don't need \$6 billion to do it."

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply**A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE
DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS**

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is world-wide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

THE CIA--An Attack and a Reply

[continued from preceding page]

trol, attempted to reduce personnel and expenditures, and done everything possible to eliminate waste and duplication.

Those that have been active and concerned in this process have included the Presidents, the committees of the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as well as the individual departments and agencies.

To single out one source of intelligence collection or say that competing agencies build similar systems begs the question. In this instance, competition—if it exists—may produce something that does the job for which we can all be thankful.

Contemplate the possibility of success of the strategic-arms-limitation talks if our negotiators did not have adequate knowledge about Russian weapons systems—information which the Soviets go to great lengths to conceal. One must envy the Russians in this regard, as there is little we can conceal about our weapons systems—planned or in being.

"Overwhelming Military Influence"

The allegation is made that an overwhelming military influence has developed in the U. S. intelligence system. To substantiate this, a budget figure is cited and the claim is made that because of this the military influence estimates to support their objectives, and the other intelligence agencies acquiesce. I heard this identical allegation made while sitting in the office of Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then the Director of Central Intelligence, in 1950.

The statement is also made that intelligence should be the tool of neither the military nor the White House. Amen! We agree. Intelligence—that is, the agencies and personnel in the systems—should be and is the servant of the nation.

The situation, as I see it is this: The intelligence system is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms—a career civilian since the end of World War II. He is specifically designated as the personal representative of the President and as such is the chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board, which both guides the intelligence system and is the final body for the consideration and co-ordination of national intelligence estimates. It should be especially noted that national intelligence estimates are specifically those of the Director of Intelligence, a civilian, and those who do not agree with him must take a footnote identifying themselves and their position.

The other agencies which participate in the USIB are the State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Atomic Energy Commission and the three military intelligence services—Army, Navy and Air.

It is true that five of the agencies are military and four civilian. But it is also a fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency reports through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, a civilian, and that, according to reports, Mr. Laird plans to place an Assistant Secretary of Defense over all the military intelligence agencies.

Having studied the system since its creation, I would suggest that the system is very firmly under the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, in whom President Nixon has indicated complete confidence; that there is about the proper balance between military and civilian; that the military do not dispute civilian control, and that if there are arguments over how many Russian missiles or Viet Cong are in a given place, it is because that most elusive of all intelligence ingredients, precise facts, are hard to come by.

The Pentagon Papers which have been published eloquently support my point that the CIA national intelligence estimates are quite independent of "overwhelming military influence."

Domestic Activities

One of the current American traumas has a federal investigator behind every bush. The social revolution through which we are pressing adds to the myth, as every activist group believes itself to be the subject of intense surveillance. The fact is that, unless the group has as its objective the destruction of our National Government, it is the recipient of benign neglect by the intelligence and security agencies. Their attention is elsewhere.

Thus, the charge that CIA and the intelligence system, "might" be turning their attention to "the enemy within" strikes a responsive note, and when this is defined as dissident student groups, a most sensitive chord has been struck.

Add to this a clandestine recruitment on a university campus, and you have the stage set.

Who does have the responsibility for internal security in the United States?

In the first instance, this rests with local and State governments. Only if federal laws are violated, federal property or personnel affected do Washington agencies become concerned, and the principal one is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI investigates cases of alleged subversion and espionage—and also violations of civil rights. Its authority and jurisdiction is unassailed and unassailable by other federal agencies.

The military intelligence-and-security services are responsible for the protection of their installations and personnel, both in the United States and overseas. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina, has addressed the issue as to whether the military services have overstepped those bounds.

The Central Intelligence Agency has no internal-security, police or subpoena powers. It investigates its own applicants and persons with whom it must deal, but its attention is directed outside the United States. There are no professors secretly on the CIA's payroll, although some have assisted the Agency in spotting individuals who might qualify for intelligence work abroad.

As far as depots of "untraceable arms," airlines and other installations are concerned, one wonders how the CIA could accomplish the tasks required of it in Southeast Asia without such facilities. Or perhaps it is being suggested that the Communists should be allowed to ignore the 1962 Geneva Accord and take over Laos without a struggle.

A "Clandestine Attitude" and "Cold-War Mentality"

One of the most frequently repeated allegations by Moscow is that the United States Government through the CIA perpetuates the cold war. This must be placed in the context of 105 Russians being expelled from Great Britain for subversive activities including planned sabotage. Here we have the criticism that the CIA has a penchant for paramilitary activities, a "talent" for clandestine operations—and, by implication, appears to spend much time trying to decide where next to engage in these dark acts. He claims that he is convinced that the CIA was involved in the overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam and of Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Let's start with the last allegation first:

The events surrounding the overthrow of President Ngo

[continued from page 82]

Dinh Diem of South Vietnam now are quite well known. At the time, the CIA kept the United States Government well informed of the plotting by the South Vietnamese military against Diem.

The CIA did not participate in, nor encourage the plotting and was operating under the direct and detailed control of the State Department and White House. When the plotters became aware of the cooling of American support for Diem, they moved.

As far as Prince Norodom Sihanouk is concerned, to the best of my knowledge the United States had no role in his overthrow.

The critical comments about a "clandestine attitude" and "cold-war mentality" impress me as being in the same vein as the comments of those who oppose military forces because if they exist they will be used. The modern history of Sweden and Switzerland refutes the latter contention.

I note he uses the word "talent" in describing the capability for clandestine operations. This talent is a necessity as long as information essential for our security cannot be obtained openly.

It was with great satisfaction that I read of Secretary of State Rogers's concern that the massive subversive activities of the Russians could affect discussions on European security. Perhaps then, and only then, can there be an agreement to reduce arms and limit clandestine activity. I, for one, am convinced that any lessening of our vigilance before reaching a meaningful and enforceable agreement with the Russians could lead to national catastrophe. Until then, like it or not, there is a cold war!

"Amorality"

The attack by vague generality and innuendo is as old as the war of words. This assault follows that technique. "If you murder—" and "one of the things the CIA clandestine people can do is start up wars" are two quotes. Another statement that is closer to the truth is: "I don't have very much to go on."

Any person who has ever had the privilege of serving with the Central Intelligence Agency will be deeply offended by the charge of amorality.

In the first place, a student of intelligence organizations would be quick to point out that if you cannot trust the people in it, you are doomed to failure. The Russians are now experiencing that in London. The damage that one can do who betrays his trust is incalculable.

The point is that the most important principle that must be used in building an intelligence organization is that its personnel must be of unimpeachable integrity. They are not recruited because they are amoral adventurers, as is implied. They are hired only if they have high intellectual achievements and are of good character.

These are the standards the CIA has followed for nearly a quarter of a century. Happily, it has been correct in its selection of personnel in most instances.

The CIA has not and does not engage in murder. It is not only practically impossible to conceal but it is unnecessary. The Green Beret case most emphatically demonstrates this.

The CIA does not "start wars." Its mission is to stop wars—not start them. That is not to say that it will not assist those who want to defeat Communist insurgency. That is its mission—and, incidentally, is also one of the reasons why the CIA is one of the Russians' favorite targets. It is one of the most effective opponents of Communism.

If one wishes further assurance on these points, examine the controls over the CIA and the intelligence system.

The Controls on CIA

One of the very frequent criticisms of the CIA is that there are not controls over it. This man wants more congressional control and more presidential control. Let's examine the facts.

In the Congress there are four subcommittees that have full authority to review all of the activities of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies. In both the Senate and the House, there are subcommittees of both Appropriations and Armed Services. In the Senate, members of the Foreign Relations Committee are invited to joint briefings of the other subcommittees.

As the executive director-comptroller of the Agency, it was one of my responsibilities to assist the Director in the presentation of the CIA budget to the Appropriations subcommittees. Over the years, I worked closely with the legislative-liaison staff of the CIA. My first appearance before the congressional committee for the CIA was in 1951. My last was in 1965. It is with this background that I speak.

Not only does the CIA fully reveal its budget to the Appropriations subcommittees, it goes into whatever detail the members desire. The CIA has never refused to answer a question forthrightly and frankly from a member of these committees. In fact, the CIA has taken the initiative in insuring that the subcommittees were kept fully informed of its activities.

The President of the United States has four major means for controlling the CIA in the intelligence system: (1) His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger today—has a large staff which works continually with the CIA and the other intelligence agencies; (2) the Office of Management and Budget critically examines every detail of the CIA and the other budgets; (3) the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of distinguished private citizens, many with extensive Government experience, is charged with a continual review of all intelligence activities of the Government; (4) the Departments of State, Defense and Justice have extensive relations with the CIA at every level and would be quick to report any ill-advised activity or operation. I am tempted to add to this: (5) an all-pervasive press in a society that has few if any secrets.

I will add that within the CIA there is a system of checks and reviews that gives the Director a very tight control over the Agency. These include an inspector general and audit staff and a continual review of all activities.

Beyond all this, however, there is one additional top-level committee before which every covert-action program must go to be judged, before it begins and periodically while it is enduring. This committee sits at the White House and is chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

I submit that there is no federal agency of our Government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and "control" than the CIA.

What Should Be Done?

Obviously I do not believe in this critic—either in the method of attack or in the substance of the comments. He should know that if his views have merit he has several avenues of appeal: to the congressional committees, to the President's board, to the Bureau of the Budget. He has chosen to fight it out in public, yet he should realize that there are few responsible newsmen who believe that such issues can be examined in detail in public without being more destructive than constructive.

[END]

Analysis

A Political Struggle Goes On Behind Peking's Flourishes

By PETER J. KUMPA
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A magician baffling an audience with his flourishes and whirling hand movements succeeds with his tricks because those fooled keep looking at the wrong thing.

So it is with the situation in Peking where world attention is focused on the flourishes—the cancellations of a national day celebration, the customary receptions, speeches and editorials.

Even more diverting are mysterious plane crashes in Mongolia and the reported but unconfirmed illnesses or deaths of such political figures in mainland China as the party chairman, Mao Tse-tung, and his political heir, the defense minister, Lin Piao.

Putting aside these bits of Chinese drama, there are some substantive unquestioned facts that can put the Peking magic act in sharper focus.

There is a political struggle going on.

There has been a contest between "two lines" evident throughout the 22 years of history of the People's Republic of China, one that was not settled by the cultural revolution. A good look at the ideological content of the mainland press show it is still continuing.

Fundamental Struggle

The battle is less over individuals than about the course that mainland China will take in building what they call "socialism" and what the West would describe as "Communism."

It is a fundamental struggle on such critical points as how the internal economy will be or-

ganized, how the government will be shaped and what sort of foreign policy will be pursued.

In their short history, the Chinese communists have wobbled back and forth on such questions as how they would organize the country's agriculture (its greatest wealth and home of three-quarters of its people) or how to educate their children.

It is an oversimplification, but in essence, the battle has been waged between groups that can be divided into "moderate" or "pragmatic" and "radical" or "extremist." All of them are Communists, convinced Marxists and Maoists and far, far from what Americans would call moderates or radicals in our western political framework.

Violent Phase

Since the close of the violent phase of the cultural revolution, the trend has been moving slowly but surely in favor of the moderates in the Peking power structure.

The moderates can be identified. They are largely backers of Premier Chou En-lai, senior government-oriented cadres and many, if not most regional military leaders. The radicals are centered in the old "cultural revolution group" of the party that was led by Chairman Mao's former political secretary, Chen Po-ta, and included Chairman Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, the intelligence chief, Kang Sheng, and a number of young Shanghai political leaders as well as a few military chieftains.

Chairman Mao, himself, generally stayed above the battle.

Lin Piao had tenuous connections with the radicals but wavered or vanished at times.

"Sham Marxists"

In recent ideological assaults, the radicals have been denounced by the ken term "sham Marxists," who have been too idealistic while they in turn argued against those who would forget the need for revolution.

The fight between the two groups was ready for a showdown when the country's provincial party structure was recently completed.

Reading from the evidence available, the Chinese media, the conclusion is inescapable that the moderates have gained a strong upper hand. This is reinforced by such policy decisions as the opening of a dialogue with the United States that will come with President Nixon's trip.

The "sham Marxists" are taking a fearful beating in the media. Pledges are being taken to fight them to the end and drive them out.

Radicals Missing

Clear targets such as Chen Po-ta, the No. 4 in their hierarchy have been missing for months. Madame Mao is still around but is rather protocol appearances, not party ones. Other radicals are also missing.

There seems little doubt that the ever visible, ever busy Premier Chou has gained ascendancy in the political struggles. Some analysts here believe this victory is so solid that such giants as Lin Piao may have fallen if indeed he is not seriously ill, an event that would not be

surprising considering his history of chronic ailments.

The new Chinese leadership when it emerges is expected to have a slightly less red hue. That it does not at this time could be due to different reasons, that the last battle still has not been fought or that it is simply too embarrassing to dump a figure like Madame Mao.

The names of the leaders are less important than the trend—Peking is turning more pragmatic, less tied to the ideological anchors of extreme and revolutionary Maoism.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM RADIO NEW YORK

STATION WOR

DATE October 20, 1971 4:25 PM CITY New York

INTERVIEW WITH VICTOR MARCHETTI AUTHOR OF "THE ROPE DANCER"

JOHN WINGATE: He was a guest before and he's agreed to come back again. Victor Marchetti, for fourteen years with the Central Intelligence Agency. And he wrote the new novel, "The Rope Dancer", based on the life of a spy.

Victor Marchetti, formerly of the C.I.A., how does a spy work? Does he come into Washington or do they cable him instructions in code or what happens?

VICTOR MARCHETTI: Generally, a spy is recruited in place. This is the preferred way. He is spotted by, say a diplomat may notice that there is a certain individual high up in the target government who seems not to be completely satisfied with the way things are going. He will be observed for a while and he will of course be checked out. When it is considered that he is a good possibility, someone will be flown in usually, they don't want to use anybody operating in that country to make a recruitment pitch to him.

If he accepts the recruitment pitch, and he's doing this on ideological -- for ideological motives, there is not much money going to change hands and whatever money he does get will

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be put into escrow for him in the event that he should live through the adventure and be resettled someday elsewhere in the world.

WINGATE: But suppose this man is a shrewdie, knows the value of a dollar and is ideologically, he checks out well and he says my price is two hundred thousand to get what you want.

MARCHETTI: You're getting right at the hero of my book. If an agent has access, if he has the information that the intelligence service wants, they will pay for it. Particularly the Soviet Union. They...

WINGATE: Do they pay a high price? Russia?

MARCHETTI: They have in their operational manuals which have been acquired by the C.I.A. ...

WINGATE: ... as they used to say, they've come to hand recently.

MARCHETTI: Yes. They say, don't ever turn him down for money, and give him anything he wants. It's far, far better to overpay him and have him produce the information than to lose this potential source.

WINGATE: Do we tend to be rather more tight-fisted?

MARCHETTI: Yes. I think so. And it's because of this urge to get people who want to spy for reasons other than money.

WINGATE: Would you rather have a spy who agreed with you ideologically or a spy who knew what he was doing and held you up for all the money he could take?

MARCHETTI: I would -- if that were the choice, and all

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things being equal, I would prefer the ideologically-motivated man.

WINGATE: Why?

MARCHETTI: Because he will take more risks; he may even be willing to give his life for the operation; he can be trusted. However, if I were operating in the field, and I found an agent who had tremendous access to information we really needed, I'd pay him anything he asked to get it.

WINGATE: How much would you pay him for an assassination?

MARCHETTI: An assassination has to be approved, theoretically, by the Director, with the concurrence of still higher authority.


WINGATE: If you wanted to do it, you'd pay him what he wanted?

MARCHETTI: I would. Yes.

WINGATE: That's Victor Marchetti former C.I.A. officer who tells of espionage in his new book, "The Rope Dancer".

MARCHETTI REVELATIONS -- East Berlin, Neues Deutschland, German,
27 Oct 71, p 7

The former CIA agent Victor Marchetti, once the main adviser to CIA deputy director Taylor, reveals in U.S. News and World Report that "one of the things that CIA agents can do is incite wars." The CIA laid the foundation for U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Among its present fields of activity are primarily Cambodia and Laos. The CIA is also concentrating on South America, India, Africa, and the Philippines, where social revolutions are in progress. The process of taking action "against the internal enemy in the United States" has begun.

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